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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY*
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INTRODUCTION.

9pRODUCTS LIABILITY" is a convenient term to denote the
liability of manufacturers and distributors for personal and property injuries caused by their products. Obviously, the study of such a
subject must involve some consideration of history, for each intersecting strand of doctrine has developed along a different line. Some
attempt to compare and even to rationalize these developments must be
made. The broadest division is that between contract and tort, and
the most obvious potential defendants are the manufacturer and the
retailer. This subject can therefore be most conveniently treated in
four main divisions - manufacturer's liability in negligence; manufacturer's liability in warranty; vendor's liability in negligence; and
vendor's liability in warranty. The primary focus of attention in this
article will be these four possibilities insofar as actions for personal
injuries are contemplated.
From the plaintiff's point of view the existence of these possibilities may present tactical, financial or jurisdictional problems.
Usually he will look for a big name, whatever position in the chain
of distribution that person may occupy, and ponder at length the
possibility of suing that person. The chances are that the manu* This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Laws at the University of Pennsylvania.
t Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania. LL.B., University of Melbourne;
LL.M., University of Pennsylvania.
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facturer will be such a person, but the increasing growth of wealthy
chain-store retailers is modifying this picture. If both the retailer and
the manufacturer are resident within the jurisdiction, the plaintiff
will normally play safe by joining them as defendants.' The liberal
trend in interpretation of jurisdictional requirements, 2 makes it more
likely that the plaintiff will be able to sue the manufacturer as well as
the vendor, even though the manufacturer may have his head office and
manufacturing plant located in another jurisdiction. If the vendor
discovers that the plaintiff has chosen to sue him, but has not joined
the manufacturer as co-defendant, then, if the manufacturer resides
in, or has "minimum contacts" with, the jurisdiction, the vendor may
implead the manufacturer.' This course will be more convenient and
cheaper than awaiting the outcome of the action and then bringing
a separate suit against the manufacturer if liability is imposed. That
the plaintiff has chosen not to join the manufacturer, however, will
generally indicate that the vendor is a big name, such as a large chain
group retailer, and the manufacturer is not. -In such a case the vendor
may very well decide, in consideration of maintaining good relations
between himself and his supplier, not to exercise his strict legal right
of impleader.
Difficulties arise when, even under the liberal view recently taken
of jurisdictional requirements, the manufacturer cannot be sued in
the same jurisdiction. American juries, like American sporting
spectators, tend to favor the underdog, and the plaintiff may have to
forego the sympathy-inducing spectacle 4 of David fighting Goliath.
Even so, it will probably be worthwhile suing the vendor, whatever
the suspected financial standing of the latter, since the manufacturer,
even though out-of-state and not technically suable, will probably
stand behind the retailer and insure satisfaction of judgment. The
manufacturer wishes to retain good relations with all his retail outlets,
and to avoid the damaging effect on his name of a successful action,'
so he will in all likelihood step in with funds and representation as
soon as he discovers that one of his retailers has been sued. When
he does not, the retailer may write him a letter inviting him to come
and defend the action. If he does not accede to this invitation, he runs
1. Cf., Weiner v. Mayer, 3 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1938); Grant
v. Australian Knitting Mills, 50 Commw. L.R. 387 (Austl. 1933), [1936] A.C. 85.
2. E.g., McGee v. International Life, 355 U.S. 220 (1957). California court had
jurisdiction over Texas insurance company not resident or otherwise doing business
in California, since it sold its policies there and the premium money was sent from
there.
3. Cf., McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936).
4. Cf., Elkind, Products Liability: A Symposium, 24 TzNN. L. RXv. 826 (1957).
5. Cf., Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TxNN. L. Rzv. 938-45

(1957).
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the risk that the local court will regard the decision in the action
between consumer and retailer as binding on him when the retailer
brings action for recoupment.6 Then not only will he have alienated one
retailer, but he will have precluded himself from effectively arguing
certain issues and will have incurred additional costs.
The action for breach of warranty against the retailer developed
in an age which had different ideas on social policy. Codification seems
to have had an unfortunate rigidifying effect on the development of
law in this area. Nevertheless, so long as the plaintiff can meet the
requirement of privity, he will probably have an action. The construction of the Sales Act has been very indulgent, so that the warranty
action has tended to overshadow the negligence action against the
vendor; the general adequacy of the former action has meant that
the latter has only rarely been pursued. This has not been true of
the two actions against the manufacturer, since with mass production
negligence is often difficult to establish, and the two actions have tended
to coalesce.
Action for the negligence against the manufacturer will normally be
either for inadequate equipment - in determining which the standard
in the industry will often be relevant - or for inferred negligence of
an employee in the process of manufacture. It will be argued by plaintiff that the defectiveness of the product indicates carelessness where
it could have been foreseen that the safety of the consumer would be in
jeopardy if due care were not used. This is not the only possibility,
however. The law of negligence in manufacture has undergone an
interesting process of transition. In the first place Winterbottom v.
Wright7 was decided and followed at a time when industry was in a
nascent stage of development and needed judicial subsidization. The
misinterpretation of its holding by which recovery was generally confined to those enjoying the privity relation operated for a short while
without great injustice. But as industry matured and as the phenomenon of the middleman, invented for convenient mercantile purposes,
came to operate fortuitously in precluding recovery by the consumer,
the hardship of this restriction began to be felt. Various exceptions
were developed to modify this hardship, the most important being
that of inherently dangerous things. The distinction was between
things which were dangerous when perfect, such as poisons, and things
which were dangerous only when defectively made. This distinction
6. This process is called "vouching in" the warrantor. See Note, 40 MicH.

L. Rzv. 872 (1942).
7. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See text accompanying note
29 infra.
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was illogical and operated harshly for some time, until rejected by
Cardozo, J. in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' in 1917. But the
distinction has recently been revived 9 and given a new significance.
Normally the manufacturer will be held liable in the latter type of
case, i.e., for making a defective product which caused injury to the
plaintiff. But even where the manufacturer is able to say that nothing
went wrong in the process of manufacture and the product was
exactly as he intended it to be, the plaintiff may claim that issuing
the admittedly non-defective product, without warning of the danger in
the circumstances of the case, constituted negligence. Where the article
even when made properly is dangerous, it may be the manufacturer's
duty to discover anew, possibly more expensive, process to eliminate
the danger. Assuming, however, that such a danger is unavoidable,
there are two possibilities. Either the article is dangerous when employed for all its normal purposes, in which case presumably the
manufacturer should cease making such goods, or the article is Safe
when used for some purposes but becomes dangerous when used for
others. The question then arises as to how foreseeable it is that the
product will be used for any of the dangerous purposes. If such uses
are reasonably foreseeable, the dangers are not obvious to the consumer, and warning is at all feasible, the manufacturer may be under
a duty to provide a warning to the consumer by way of label, printed
message on the package or can or in some other convenient position, or
literature accompanying the product.
This sort of case has been arising with increasing frequency and
is usually brought against manufacturers of insecticides, sprays, or
other chemical mixtures. Such manufacturers usually maintain large
research departments, making it possible to argue that insufficient
experiments were carried out before letting the product out into the
community for use, or that members of such departments, in the
process of mixing and testing, should have come to appreciate the
necessity for warning against certain uses. Two writers even suggest a distinction between "directions for use" and "warnings," the
former relating to the promotion of efficiency in use, the latter concerning safety.' ° In the context of the case they discuss, where the
mandate "Do not use this product on bearing apple trees later
than . . ." was regarded as a mere "direction for use" not satisfying
the duty to warn, the distinction becomes very tenuous. It is possible
8. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1927).

9. Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn,

41 VA. L. Rev. 145 (1955).
10. Id. at 147.
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to explain the decision as resting on the construction of conflicting
provisions of a difficult statute. It may be preferable, however, to
retain the distinction for cases where consequences of noncompliance
with directions are so extreme that explicit mention of such consequences may add to the deterent effect of the direction, and where it
is suspected that the manufacturer refrained from mentioning them
out of a regard for good consumer relations - fewer people may buy
the product if danger is stressed. In such situations it does not seem
unfair to require the manufacturer to weigh the relative economies of
losing a few customers or paying compensation to those injured by
his product.
Two important recent developments are affecting the law of products liability. These are national advertising and insurance. They
have not effected an immediate change in the law, but clearly the
law must gradually adapt itself to these facts of life, 1 and cases contain increasing recognition of their importance.
In 1944, the comment was made that
"the growth of national advertising ...has raised tremendously
the potential responsibility of the seller. His buyers are now
infinite in number and often quite remote in distance - they may
be any one of the 3,000,000 readers of The Post, or of the
1,000,000 listerners of WGN."' 2
In the intervening 15 years the figures have grown to astronomic
proportions. With 42,310,000 television sets in homes in the United
States, 8 it is possible to reach as many as 50,000,000 people with one
program. 4 This not only makes the "Man in the Grey Flannel Suit"
a power to reckon with, it also changes the relationship between manufacturer and consumer. The Washington court in the Baxter case'"
was perhaps a little ahead of its time in relying upon this new factor to
hold the manufacturer liable for breach of warranty in 1932; the
decision provoked some unfavorable contemporary comment and an
unenthusiastic reaction in other jurisdictions. In more recent years,
however, the Baxter doctrine has been treated with greater enthusiasm.
11. Cf., CAIRNs, THE THEORY
SOCIAL CHANCE 200-201 (1922).

op LEGAL SCIENCE 9, 99-106

(1941);

12. Houtz, The Insurance Response to a Shifting Caveat, A.B.A.I.

OGBURN,

Insurance

Law Section 302 (1944).
13. TELEVISION AGE YEAR BooK (1958). Figure for January 1, 1958.
14. The N.B.C. show, "Some of Mannie's Friends", had an audience of over
50 million according to personal correspondence with an executive of WRCV-TV,
Philadelphia; cf., Broadcasting, March 23, 1959, p. 39 (A.R.B.) (54,630,000 viewers
of "Wagon Train").
15. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 6 where defendant's
home permanent kit did not have the "very gentle" effect on plaintiff's
coiffure that defendant had promised, but instead rendered it "cottonlike" and "gummy" and caused most of her hair to fall out, plaintiff
sued in breach of warranty. In holding that plaintiff could proceed on
this theory, the Supreme Court of Ohio drew support from considerations of history and the impact of modern advertising:
"Occasions may arise when it is fitting and wholesome to
discard legal concepts of the past to meet new conditions and
practices of our changing and progressing civilization. Today,
many manufacturers of merchandise, including the defendant
herein, make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals, signboards,
radio and television to advertise their products. The worth,
quality and benefits of these products are described in glowing
terms and in considerable detail, and the appeal is almost universally directed to the ultimate consumer. Many of these manufactured articles are shipped out in sealed containers by the
manufacturer, and the retailers who dispense them to the ultimate consumers are but conduits or outlets through which the
manufacturer distributes his goods. The consuming public
ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations of the manufacturer in his advertisements. What sensible or sound reason
then exists as to why, when the goods purchased by the ultimate
consumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed squarely
at him do not possess their described qualities and goodness and
cause him harm, he should not be permitted to move against the
manufacturer to recoup his loss. In our minds no good or valid
reason exists for denying him that right. Surely under modern
merchandising practices the manufacturer owes a very real obligation toward those who consume or use his products. The warranties made by the manufacturer in his advertisements and by
the labels on his products are inducements to the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on such
representations and later suffers injury because the product proves
to be defective or deleterious."' 7
This development, combined with the normal feeling of the manufacturer that he is responsible for defective goods,'" and the notion that
the manufacturer is in the most convenient position to absorb the loss,
have created pressures toward holding the manufacturer liable. This
leads us to consider the development of insurance, for the accessibility
16. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); cf., Symposium, AdvertisedProduct Liability, 8 C,4.-MARSH. L. Rnv. 1 (1959).
17. Supra at 248-249, 147 N.E.2d at 615-16.
18. Bogert & Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods, 25 ILL. L. Rlv. 400 (1930).
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of products liability insurance facilitates the view that the cost of the
injuries, or more accurately, the cost of the premiums, ought to be
regarded as a cost of doing business, to be passed on to the consuming
public in the form of higher prices.
The first known products liability insurance policy was issued in
England in 1890,1" but most of the important developments have taken
place in the last. two decades. After the first policy in 1890, very little
happened until after the first world war, and even in 1939 it was still
true to say that there was a seller's market in such insurance. It was
the old story of the vicious circle of caution bred of inadequate experience in underwriting this sort of risk, plus the fact that the ones
to seek such insurance in the early stages were those with comparatively hazardous enterprises and high risk rates.
By 1944, however, one observer was able to report a widespread
change in attitude on the part of insurers,2" and by 1951 the national
figure for products liability insurance premiums was placed at $182
million. 2 'Not all manufacturers, however, agree as to the business
wisdom of taking out products liability insurance.2 2 As this type of
insurance has become more widespread, better-risk industries have been
attracted and premiums have become cheaper with the result that it
has become economical for almost any manufacturer, no matter how
modest, to take out insurance. And with the increasing experience in
underwriting such insurance, the insurance companies have become
more liberal in the type of risk they are prepared to cover. They have
also become more realistic; for example, the standard type of policy
today is no longer restricted to losses for liability imposed by law, as
distinct from losses for compensation "assumed by the insured," or
by the unrealistic interpretation excluding implied warranties from
such coverage.
II.

MANUFACTURER'S

LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE

The development of the action in negligence against the manufacturer has been case law at its best and most typical. When Dean
Levi wanted an example of the judicial process in operation he chose
this development.2" It exhibits the dynamic quality of the law, the
-'flexibility, the importance of the subjective element in determining the
19. HouTrz, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 1930-1931.
20. Ibid.

21. See Miller, Manufacturer's Liability, 3 SYRAcuse L. Rv. 106 (1951).
22. Mensor, How one Canner Handles Product-Liability Claims, 7 FOOD DRUG
Cosm. L.J. 681, 692 (1952).
23. Levi, E. H., An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 507-

519 (1948).
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similiarity of the present case to those previously decided, and the
gradual crystallization of relatively certain rules as the borderlines of
a fluid concept are pricked out from case to case - all typical features
of the legal process.
Before the cases are examined, it may be worthwhile to consider
whether this area of the law lends itself to judicial development, or
whether it would have been preferable to have left the problem for
legislation. Every now and then a judge will attempt to justify his
conservatism, in this area as in others, by taking the position that if an
injustice exists, then it is up to the legislature to correct it. Despite
these expressions of judicial abstention, the legislature has sought to
intrude into the tort field only on rare occasions. Sometimes its pronouncements are given indirect effect - as when courts impute to
legislatures an intent to provide civil sanctions, or use the equity of
statutes to inspire judicial developments 4 - but generally legislatures
have left it to the courts to develop their own doctrine.
The view taken here is that the occasional expression of judicial
abstention reveals an over-refined Montesquieuan conception of the
proper constitutional division of functions, and that the "hands off"
attitude of the legislature has been entirely desirable. It is here par
excellence that the judge is charged with the duty of making the law
serve the ends and needs of justice in a changing world; here that
the boasted flexibility and adaptability of the common law are needed.
First, it is doubtful whether tort liability contains sufficient votecatching material to lead politicians to take a lively interest in the
subject, especially when there is pressure of business such as exists
today. But even if legislative inertia could be overcome, it would be
impossible for the legislature to anticipate the infinite variety of situations which are to arise in the future.2 5 Consequently much experimentation would be necessary if the matter were left to legislation.
Many statutes and much interpretation would be necessary and, even
then, by the time satisfactory formulae had been arrived at, chances
are they would be obsolete. It seems the common law technique, with
its compromise of continuity and change, is much more appropriate.
Second, legislation of this sort would undoubtedly be opposed by
powerful lobbies of manufacturers able to enlist the further support
111-112 (1954);
Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. Rtv. 383, 385, 407 (1908); Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-14 (1936).
25. Cf., Noel, Strict Liability of Manuafcturers, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963, 1016
(1957): "Even those thoroughly familiar with the problem would have trouble
drafting a suitable general statute."
24. See HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING,
READ & MACDONALD, CASES ON LEGISLATION, 1268-1279 (1948);
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of publishers who would have an interest based on expectation of
advertising.2" Local dealers, as a part of manufacturers' distributing
system, would be susceptible to the influence of these manufacturers
in securing their influence in turn with their local legislative representatives. One could not expect the resulting legislation to provide
much protection for the general public.
On the other hand the courts, being on the job all the time and
alert to effectuate social justice, enjoying longer tenure and being
comparatively free from political pressure, can be depended upon to
reach results which represent a much broader cross-section of community interests.
Third, there is not the same need in this area for laying down
clear, certain rules regulating the conduct of members of the community, as there is in other areas. Most of the situations in this area
involve, by definition, inadvertent conduct, where the influence of
legal rules must be comparatively ineffective. While the deterrent
effect of tort law should not be minimized, it must be recognized
that the law of torts tries to ride several horses, and in the compromise between deterrence and compensation, the latter is probably predominant. In any event, deterrence is more important in contracts and
property than in torts which is more concerned with an equitable ex
post facto resolution of losses which have already occurred. As such,
its problems can be much more flexibly and efficiently handled by the
judicial branch of government. In the area of contracts and property,
it is of paramount importance to be able to prophesy accurately a
court's reaction to a given pattern of conduct, since in those areas
men act and plan consciously with a view to achieving a result which
courts have indicated would involve certain consequences.2" Such
needs can be better met by the legislative organ of government.
Winterbottom v. Wright" is now largely discredited - although
it remains to haunt English law in cases involving the sale and leasing
of real estate - but it played such an important part in the development of the subject, that its position in history cannot be ignored. The
declaration alleged only that it was the duty of the defendant by virtue
of a contract with the Postmaster General to repair a mail coach, and
that failure of defendant to carry out this duty had led to plaintiff's
26. See New Yorker, March 7, 1959, p. 42: "Like any big, practical organization, Coca Cola has its own liaison channels to legislatures. Its chief lobbyist is
its senior vice-president, Edgar J. Forio .... "
27. For this suggestion, see Freezer, Manufacturers' Liability, 37 MICH. L. Rev.
1,18 & n.45 (1938).
28. Cf., Wright, The Law of Torts, 1923-1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 46 (1948)
cf., Elkind, Products Liability: A Symposium, 24 TtNN. L. Rtv. 826 (1957).
29. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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injuries when the coach broke down. The defendant's demurrer was
sustained. It is worth noting (1) that since the action was framed as
an attempt to rely upon the breach of defendant's contractual obligation to another, 0 and the matter was decided on declaration and demurrer, the actual decision holds that a person who has undertaken
to do work for another does not thereby become liable to a person
injured by his failure to perform the contract, and (2) that even with
proper pleadings, the case would be decided the same way today in his celebrated opinion in Donoghue v. Stevenson,"' Lord Atkin
referred to the decision as "manifestly right."
Despite its correctness, it marred and retarded the development
of the law for many decades. This is attributable to the wide dicta
of Lord Abinger and Baron Alderson who foresaw the most "outrageous consequences" if the floodgates were to be opened. This led
to the notion that if A undertook a contractual obligation toward B,
and his non-performance or misperformance of that obligation resulted
in damage to C, then C could not sue A unless he could show that A
had undertaken toward him the same obligation he had assumed toward B. Under the elaborate system of marketing which was fast
becoming the normal rule during the latter half of the nineteenth century this meant that the consumer injured by a defective product could
not sue the careless manufacturer of the article since he was not in
privity with the latter. With the refinement of the system to encompass wholesalers, jobbers, distributors and other links in the chain
of distribution, the operation of this extended Winterbottom v. Wright
82
rule became intolerable and courts began to invent exceptions to it.
As Llewellyn has said in reference to another, but similar, development,8 8 the emotional drive of the cases centered in the stomach,
and one of the first exceptions to the general rule of nonliability concerned food and drugs; this was later extended to include firearms
and rationalized to include all "articles intended to preserve, destroy
30. The declaration at one point uses the word "negligently," but
of the declaration suggests that this word is used in the colloquial sense
lessly," and the overriding impression is that the plaintiff is trying to
contract to which he is not a party. Cf., Cardozo, J. in MacPherson

the tenor
of "careenforce a
v. Buick

Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1059 (1916): ". . . the form of the
declaration . . . did not fairly suggest the existence of a duty aside from the
special contract which was the plaintiff's main reliance ....
." Cf., Donoghue v.

Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 589, Lord Atkin: "It is to be observed that no negligence apart from breach of contract was alleged - in other words, no duty was
alleged other than the duty arising out of the contract. . . ." and at 608 Lord
Macmillan: ". . . it is a singular fact that the case of Winterbottom v. Wright is

one in which no negligence in the sense of breach of a duty owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff was alleged on the part of the plaintiff."

31. [1932] A.C. 562, 589.
32. Cf., Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1938).
33. LL WzLLYN, CAsEs ON SALES 342 (1930).
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or affect human life." The most important exception was known
variously and vaguely3 4 as the exception of "imminently," "intrinsically" or more often "inherently" dangerous articles - the distinction
was between things the normal function of which was to destroy (such
as guns, poisons etc.) and things which only became dangerous if
negligently made. While these exceptions made the law more tolerable,
they led to some quite irrational distinctions and refinements, and the
tendency - encouraged by the decision in Huset v. The Case Threshing
Mach. Co. 5 - was to apply them pedantically. For example, the
exclusion of machinery, motor cars, boilers and the like, on the basis
that they were not intended when perfect to preserve, destroy or affect
human life was irrational,"6 since these things were just as dangerous
when negligently made as the articles within the exception.
In 1916, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,37 the New York

Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Cardozo, allowed the purchaser of a defective motor car to recover for his injuries against the
manufacturer, with whom he was not in privity. Although Judge
Cardozo paid lip service to the received doctrine and vocabulary, 8
he effectively applied liability based on foreseeability of harm by extending liability beyond things which in their normal operation are
implements of destruction to things the nature of which is such that
they are "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made." In jurisdictions which accepted it, the MacPherson
case "caused the exception to swallow the asserted general rule of
non-liability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate.""9
Gradually other jurisdictions came to accept the MacPherson rule,
Massachusetts being the last to capitulate in 1946.4o
It was a necessary part of judicial statesmanship to use the accepted concepts and preserve an appearance of continuity with the past
in order to forestall the possible objection that he was innovating.
But although some courts still talk in terms of things "inherently
dangerous," the trend has been to emphasize those parts of Cardozo's
34. As Bohlen pointed out, the interchangeable use of "imminently" and "inherently" - words which are far from synonymous - shows how vague it was.
Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendors,
45 L.Q. Rzv. 343, 354-355 & n.22 (1929).
35. 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
36. See Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendors, 45 L.Q1 Rtv. 343, 358-359 (1929).
37. 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916).

38. So much so, that Lord Buckmaster, who dissented in Donoghue v. Stevenson
thought that MacPherson was just another example of an exception: In . . .
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. . . . the learned judge appears to base his judgment on the view that a motor-car might reasonably be regarded as a dangerous
article." [1932] A.C. 562, 577.
39. Carter v. Yardley, 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946).
40. Carter v. Yardley, supra note 39.
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opinion which base liability on a "risk" approach, and the other language is conveniently forgotten:
"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to
be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully."'"
Sixteen years later the English House of Lords, using language
strikingly reminiscent of Cardozo, and in fact expressly referring to
the MacPherson decision, made even clearer the point that manufacturer's tort liability is simply part of a wider field of negligence,
liability for which rested basically on factors of foreseeability and risk.
This was the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson,42 which arose by way
of a Scottish procedure similar to a demurrer. Appellant had averred
that a friend had purchased for her some ginger beer contained in a
bottle made out of dark opaque glass, that some of the ginger beer
had been poured out into a glass, that she had consumed the first
glass and her friend proceeded to pour the remainder of the contents
of the bottle into the glass when a snail, in a state of decomposition,
floated out. She further averred that the sight of the snail and the
realization that she had already consumed ginger beer affected by the
snail, caused her severe physical injuries. The respondent, manufacturer of the ginger beer, objected that these averments did not disclose
a good cause of action. The holding of the House of Lords, by a three
to two majority, in favor of the appellant, thus amounted to no more
than a decision that she was entitled to recover if she could prove these
allegations.
The difficulty of stating the holding, inevitably created by multiple court decisions, is especially acute here, where there are wide
differences in reasoning even within the judgments of the three members of the majority. If the subsequent decisions are ignored, one
can of course state an infinite number of propositions between a very
wide foreseeability principle and a proposition so narrow - in terms
of Scottish married women etc. - as to be virtually useless as a
precedent. However the main field of controversy has narrowed to a
choice between the wide "neighbour" rationale and the narrow ("headnote") rationale which is confined to the question of the liability of
41. 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 11 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916).
42. [1932] A.C. 562.
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the manufacturer. Both principles are contained in the judgment of
Lord Atkin, which reasons from the former to the latter. His statement of the wide rationale is the more famous:
"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to
be - persons who are closely and directly affected by my act that
I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing 43my mind to the acts or omissions
which are called in question.
His statement of the narrow rationale is:
"[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form
as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer
in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility
of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the
absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the
products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or prop'44
erty, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.'
Professor Houston has argued4 5 that although the wider principle is the one for which the case is most frequently cited, and although
this principle may be considered part of the rationale of the judgment
of Lord Atkin, it cannot be regarded as part of the rationale of the
court, and no amount of retroactive citation can make it such. This,
while true, does not minimize the importance of the effect of the judgment of Lord Atkin on the development of this area of the law. However analytically sound Professor Houston's reasoning may be, the
important thing is that subsequently courts have accepted Lord Atkin's
reasoning and have regarded manufacturers' liability as simply part
of a wider field of negligence. Of course it is true that each decision
in the field of products liability, like decisions in any other area, tends
to departmentalize the law of torts by pouring content into the reasonable foreseeability standard and fixing a precedent for similar
fact situations. As MacDonald J. has put it,
"It is no less true that every case of a duty .established in respect
of a given situation-pattern established a legal duty in similar
situation-patterns as they may arise. This process was strikingly
manifested in Donoghue v. Stevenson itself and in later cases
which applied its principle to varying
aspects of the manufacturer46
ultimate consumer situation.
43. Id. at 580.
44. Id. at 599.

45. 20 MODERN L. Rtv. 1, 9 (1957).
46. Nova Mink Ltd. v. TCA, [1951] D.L.R. 241, 256.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6: p. 1

The fact remains that the courts take the same basic approach and
employ the same general considerations in deciding products liability
cases as any other negligence cases. Some of the important consequences of this will now be considered.
One consequence is that factors such as magnitude of risk, gravity
of threatened harm, ease of precautions and value to be achieved by
defendant's activity will be relevant to the question of the defendant's
duty. If the defendant is manufacturing a high-powered explosive, he
will have to exercise much more care than a fountain pen manufacturer. This is not to erect degrees of care or to place special significance
on a category of dangerous chattels, but simply to say that "due
care under the circumstances" requires greater caution in the former
situation. Even if the risk is not very great and the harm which will
occur if the risk materializes is comparatively slight, a showing that
the defendant could easily have avoided the danger will raise the standard of care required of the defendant. A good example is provided by
Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., " where plaintiff, a teacher supplied by
the defendant with "oil samples," poured liquid from a sample on some
metal and was injured in the resulting explosion, the sample having
contained water instead of kerosene. On appeal from a verdict for
plaintiff, the appellate court stresses the fact that the danger could
easily have been avoided:
"It would have been so easy to have warned the recipient. ...
If we feel the defendant at least somewhat culpable in failing
to take the simple step of warning, then we see no reason to take
the case from the jury when the consequences are serious, and,
because serious, are unexpected." 4
The main consequence of this attitude is that the courts will
use the same general criteria of foreseeability as they employ in other
negligence issues. Thus if the plaintiff has put the product to an
unusual use which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the
manufacturer, the manufacturer will escape liability. In Schfranek v.
Benjamin Moore & Co.,4" plaintiff purchased a painting compound
manufactured by the defendant and distributed in powder form. In the
course of mixing the compound plaintiff placed his hand in the package, whereupon his hand was cut by some glass contained in the
powder. In granting the motion to dismiss the complaint alleging negligence, the court stated the appropriate question to be
47. 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939).
48. Id. at 186.
49. 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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"whether the probable normal and appropriate use to which the
thing in question is intended by the manufacturer to be put would
involve injury to its user, if it is wrongfully compounded or negligently inspected." 5
Since the plaintiff's use of the product was abnormal and not reasonably to be expected by the defendant-manufacturer, liability could
not be imposed.
In Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp.,5 purchaser of a baby
bathinette sued the manufacturer for injuries resulting when the
bathinette ignited in the buyer's bathroom and its magnesium alloy
supports burned fiercely before the fire could be extinguished. The
evidence about the cause of the fire being in conflict, the trial court
charged the jury that there could be no recovery unless the jury found
that "this baby bathinette was the cause of the occurrence of the fire
originally." On the jury's returning a verdict for the defendant, the
plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury charge had been erroneous.
The United States Court of Appeals held that the charge was proper,
since the bathinette was not dangerous when used in the normal way:
"It was only in situations of abnormality that it became dangerous; that is where it was exposed to extreme heat, and it
would not reasonably be expected that a bathinette constructed in
part of wood and plastic would be used
where it would come into
52
contact with heat of some 11000 F."
The dissent of Judge Frank does not challenge the reasoning of the
majority but differs in the attitude taken toward what could be classified as reasonably foreseeable. Judge Frank took the view that a fire
was reasonably foreseeable, in light of the number of fires occurring
each year in the United States (roughly a million) and the millions of
fire insurance policies issued.
This leads into a discussion of liability to people with abnormal
susceptibilities, such as allergic conditions. This area presents two
problems: (1) the liability for damages which are inflamed by the
existence of plaintiff's abnormal condition, in cases where "normal"
persons would have suffered some harm, (2) liability for injury caused
by the special susceptibility, where no injury would have been suffered by normal persons. The reasoning in the Polemis case5 3 suggests recovery for inflamed damages in the first situation. These cases
are sometimes referred to as the "eggshell skull" situations, in which it
is said that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. This in
50. Id. at 77.
51. 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954).
52. Id. at 105.
53. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
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fact is the answer given by courts. 54 Where no injury would have been
suffered by normal persons, the application of a Palsgraf type duty
analysis would suggest that no duty is owed to such persons, especially
when it is remembered that "there must be knowledge of danger, not
merely possible but probable." 5 In an interesting passage in Bourhill

v. Young,"0 Lord Wright develops this theme. It is noteworthy,
though, that every example of special susceptibility given could be based
on the notion of voluntary assumption of risk - the "bleeder" who
mixes with the crowd, the blind or deaf man crossing the busy street,
and the pregnant plaintiff herself in Bourhill v. Young. It may not
be possible to say this of the allergic victim for many people are not
aware of their own allergies. Therefore the examples put by Lord
Wright may be distinguishable. There is another important difference in the manufacturer's situation which may lead to a different
result. True it is that the defendant is not obliged to guard against
a remote contingency,5 7 and it may appear at first sight that the manufacturer, even if he knows of the existence of an allergic group, is
in the same position vis-a-vis a member of that group as the driver
of a motorcycle vis-a-vis a pregnant fishwife - since the driver knows
that there may be a pregnant woman in a large group of people. But
in the latter case, the defendant is committing a single act, while in the
former case the manufacturer is producing a large number of products.
While each product, considered in isolation, may be unlikely to injure
anybody, it may be possible to predict for example that in every
hundred products sold, five will cause injury to an allergic group. Injury to them is not merely possible but probable. There may be a
parallel in the situation where a person fires a shot into a large
crowd. He does not know who is going to be injured, but it may be
likely that some person will be, and that person will certainly have
an action against the firer. Such reasoning, then, seems to justify the
special rule announced in Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co.,"8 that where
the seller or maker knows of the existence of an allergic group, he
may be liable to a member of that group. Knowledge is essential,
however, and an important factor in the decision in the Gerkin case
was defendant's letter to the local dealer which showed defendant was
aware of a special group.
54. Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631 (1934);

Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive,

[1941] 41 N.S.W. St. 48, 51; Richards v. Baker,

[1943] So. Austl. St. 245.
55. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
56. [1943] A.C. 92, 109-110.
57. Cf., Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850.
58. 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
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This reasoning merely shows that there may be foreseeability if
a sufficiently large number of products is distributed. Where does
that lead us? It certainly does not automatically establish liability
but leads only to the conclusion that the defendant is under a duty
of care. Another way of putting this is that the defendant is only
liable in a negligence action if harm could have been avoided by the
exercise of human care. Now it may be, as some cases have pointed
out,59 that in some situations nothing the defendant could have done
would have prevented the injury, and in such case the defendant
would not be liable. This leads us to draw a distinction between cases
where some preliminary test is available to determine whether the
purchaser is within an allergic group, and those where no such test
is available. In the former cases, where a special allergic group exists
and is known, the defendant is under a duty to warn the consumer.
If the product is one likely to be used in performance of some service, such as hair dye, defendant has a duty to warn the hairdresser or
other person who will be using the product of the possibility of injury to members of an allergic group and to give instructions on
how to test consumers or customers for allergic reactions before the
product is used. Such warning discharges the defendant's duty to the
consumer or ultimate recipient of the service."' The duty to warn
may put the manufacturer in something of a dilemma - giving the
necessary warning may be bad customer relations,6 1 and may deter
some from buying his product. However, if the manufacturer for
business reasons prefers to conceal the possibility of injury, it seems
fair to make him regard the damages resulting from injuries as part
62
of the cost of operating his business.
Another important effect of regarding manufacturer's liability as
a category of negligence has been to facilitate the extension of liability
beyond the manufacturer-consumer relationship. In the MacPherson
opinion, Judge Cardozo used cautious language - probably in order
to make his opinion more acceptable to the conservative section of the
profession - and was careful to limit his decision to situations where
the manufacturer of the finished product, having put the product on
the market to be used without inspection, is sued by the sub-vendee
who has suffered personal injuries. Consistent with the Atkinneighbour principle, however, there is no reason why recovery should
59. E.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1956).
60. Holmes v. Ashford, [1950] 2 All E.R. 76; cf., Dillard & Hart, Product
Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rgv. 145 n.9 (1955).
61. Cf., Note, 49 MicH. L. Rv. 261 n.44 (1950).
62. Cf., Wright v. Carter Products Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1957).
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be confined to the ultimate purchaser 3 - certainly in cases of products such as automobiles, injury to others than the purchaser is
eminently foreseeable if care is not exercised in manufacture and
inspection - and later courts have allowed recovery to persons outside
the chain of distribution. It was an easy matter to say that the manufacturer of electric current transformers who shipped them with
wooden blocks packed inside them could foresee injury to the employees of the purchaser of the transformers were installed without
the blocks being removed.64 The transformers had to be installed by
someone, and the employees of the purchaser constituted the most
obvious class of persons foreseeably endangered by the defendant's
lack of care. An even more striking extension was made by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1928 in Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co."5
when they permitted a pedestrian injured in an automobile accident to
recover against the defendant used car dealer whose negligent failure
to equip the car with efficient brakes before its resale was found to
have caused the accident. Much of the reasoning of the opinion is unsatisfactory, but the basis for imposing liability is clearly stated in the
following sentence: "[Defendants] should have anticipated that some
one was likely to be run down upon the streets of the city of La Crosse
in the then condition of the car." 66 This, and other cases which reach
similar results,67 would seem to justify the proposition contained in
the Restatement of Torts allowing recovery to persons whom the manufacturer "should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the
other or to be in the vicinity of its probable use." 6
Another question expressly left open in the MacPherson case was
that of the liability of the maker of component parts.69 This question
has also been subsequently answered in favor of liability.7 ° This is
consistent with modern notions of superseding cause, according to
which the supervening conduct of another, even though that conduct
63. In fact, the application of this principle led to a non-purchaser recovering in
the Donoghue case, itself.
64. Rosebrach v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
65. 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).

66. Id. at 210, 218 N.W. at 860.
67. E.g., Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y.
Supp. 657 (1933), which contains the much more satisfactory discussion: "This
step beyond the literal application of the MacPherson and Smith opinions takes us
no deeper into a region of doubt as to tort liability than do many cases in which
recovery in tort has been granted to those whose liability to injury was held reasonably to be anticipated. . . . The situations of this plaintiff and the truck were
neither strange nor remote from reasonable expectation - the girl walking along a public sidewalk, the truck being driven along a public street.
68. RzSTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1934).
69. "We are not required, at this time, to say that it is legitimate to go back
of the manufacturer of the finished product and hold the manufacturers of the component parts. . . ." 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
70. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
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is negligent, 7 ' or even criminal,72 is not regarded as insulating the
previous actor from liability, provided that the later conduct was foreseeable. There is even less reason for regarding the negligence of another person as having this effect where it takes the form of an
omission to act.
Products liability has its own special problems of proof. Almost
all negligence actions are subject to the difficulty that, with crowded
court lists, witnesses are called upon to testify as to matters which
occurred many months prior to the litigation. In light of the imperfection of human facility for observing and remembering events, 71 this
is bad enough. But the modern consumer who is injured by a defective product meets the additional difficulty that the supposedly
negligent conduct occurred some time prior to his injury, generally
in a factory using mass production techniques which make identification of individual products impossible. When to these problems are
added that the plaintiff will probably lack access to information concerning the defendant's equipment and processes, and faces evidence
of employees of the defendant who, wishing to retain good relations
with their employer, are not likely to testify favorably to the plaintiff,74 it becomes obvious that the lot of the plaintiff is not an easy
one - or would not be, if the courts had not responded to the need to
rectify this injustice by giving new life to an old tool.
The "tool" referred to is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
was devoloped in an age when the absence of modern pre-trial procedures such as interrogatories must often have placed the 'plaintiff
in a position with respect to access to evidence inferior to that of the
defendant. This raison d'etre which has been erroneously elevated to
the position of an indispensable requirement by some courts75 has
lost much of its force with the development of modern techniques for
obtaining information in advance of trial, 7' but the doctrine is retained
to implement modern accident compensation policies - policies thought
to have special application in this area where the defendant is generally
in a superior position to absorb and redistribute the loss.
71. E.g., Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N.E. 612 (1929).
72. E.g., Anderson v. Gengras Motors, 141 Conn. 688, 109 A.2d 502 (1954);
Cf., In England, Stansbie v. Troman, [1948] 2 K.B. 48.
73. Cf., Williams, The Aims of the Law of Torts, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PaoBLMs,

137, 173 &n.173 (1951).

74. The likelihood of a witness employed by one of the litigants being biased
in favor of his employer is so great and notorious, that it may be the subject of
judicial, notice. Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 150

&n.66 (1956).
75. See cases collected in PROSSSR, LAW Ov TORTS 209 (2d ed. 1955); and see,
Fricke, Of Mice and Men and Unrefreshing Pauses, 3 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 321
(1959).
76. Although in special cases this factor may still give vitality to the rule.
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
[VOL. 6 : p. 1

The use of the res ipsa loquitur device has tended to erode concepts of fault liability in all negligence actions. To understand how
it has had this effect, we need to examine the underlying rationale and
the express requirements of the doctrine.
In the usual case, plaintiff will introduce direct evidence of defendant's conduct, e.g., that defendant did not slow down before turning a corner in his car. Sometimes, however, he lacks knowledge of
any specific conduct on the part of the defendant, and will have to
resort to circumstantial evidence from which the defendant's negligence can be inferred.
"There must be reasorable evidence of negligence. But where
the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of
77
care."

The logical relationship between a requirement that the accident be
of a type which is more often than riot attributable to negligent conduct and the problems of proof should be obvious: the plaintiff in a
civil case is required to establish this case "on the balance of probabilities," and proof of the occurrence of a type of injury which is as
easily attributable to unavoidable accident as it is to negligence does
not tend to establish the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of
the evidence. 78 But observe how the requirement is formulated in the
above traditional statement of the doctrine - the accident must be
"such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care." This is misleading. To determine whether an accident was more likely than not the result of
the defendant's negligence, obviously one must look, not at the general range of experience concerning the use of such instrumentalities,
but only at the occasions when accidents happen, and ask whether
such accidents are more frequently than not attributable to the negligence of those in control. Whether accidents are rare or common
throws no light on the question of the likelihood of the defendant's
negligence being the cause of the accident. Yet the traditional formulation directs attention to such an inquiry. To give an example, suppose that on 90% of the occasions when a certain instrumentality
was used, it caused injury to nobody, while 70% of the accidents,
i.e., 7% of total, were unavoidable by human care, and the remaining
77. Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596 (1865).
78. Cf., Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TPXAs L. Rxv. 257, 260 (1948),
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3% were attributable to human carelessness. It would then be true
to say that such an accident "does not ordinarily happen if due care is
used," yet it would not be true to say that such accidents are "more
often than not" negligently caused.
Starling Morris expresses this viewpoint well in the following
passage:
"In the relatively simple cases, such as falling objects, a
general conclusion that such mishaps do not. ordinarily occur
unless one is negligent is likely to be reached even though no evidence is offered in court to support that conclusion. Such a
conclusion probably accords with fact more often than not. But in
a large number of cases involving more comilicated types of
accidents which are not within common experience and the causes
of which are certainly not a matter'of common knowledge, the
courts have said res ipsa loquitur when 'the thing speaks for itself' only because the court is willing to speculate or because it
has special knowledge or imagines that it has. Does the electrocution of a person in his home by excessive current coming from
an ordinary electrical fixture speak negligence of someone in
causing the excessive current to enter the house? Does a derailment of a train speak negligence? Does the explosion of a 'pop'
bottle without more indicate an absence of due care? Mishaps
of that sort do not occur in the ordinary course of things, true,
but is the ordinary course interrupted more often by negligence
than by some other cause? Obviously such occurrences speak
danger, but whether they speak unreasonable conduct is another
matter. I doubt that the causes of such occurrences are sufficiently within common knowledge to say res ipsa loquitur. The
result reached in such cases may be supportable, but not because
the mishap speaks for itself unless evidence supports the conclusion that this is a type
of mishap which is caused by negligence
79
more often than not."1

The fallacious reasoning which the normal formulation is likely
to induce is well illustrated in the case of Cavero v. Franklin Benevolvent Society,"° where a child had died on the operating table during a
tonsillectomy. An expert witness was asked whether death was the
normal result of such operations when performed carefully, and replied that she had performed "hundreds of these tonsillectomies" and
that this was "the first case in which a death had ever occurred." The
majority stated the requirement in the traditional terms of whether
such an accident ordinarily occurs when due care is used, and concluded
on the basis of this expert testimony that the requirement had been
satisfied. Justice Traynor, dissenting, asserted that such testimony
79. Id. at 262-63. (Emphasis supplied).
80. 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950).
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"establishes only that such accidents are rare; it was silent on
the question as to what are the probable causes when such deaths
do occur . . . the court in effect holds that solely because an accident is rare it was more probably than not caused by negligence.
There is a fatal hiatus in such reasoning. The fact that an accident is rare establishes only that the possible causes seldom occur.
It sheds no light on the question of which of the possible causes
is the more probable when an accident does happen ... "Another example is provided by the case of United States v.
Kesinger,82 where the court allowed recovery for an airplane accident
by relying on evidence of safety records of airplane companies. This
evidence showed that accidents are rare, but showed nothing about the
relative incidence of negligent and non-negligent factors which cause
such accidents. s3
Later we will consider the "exploding bottle" cases in detail, but
at this point it is worth observing that in the very first case where
res ipsa was applied to the bursting bottle situation, the reasoning of
the court was infected with the type of fallacious thinking we have
been discussing. That was the case of Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 4 where the defendant's bottle exploded, destroying the
plaintiff's sight. In applying the res ipsa doctrine to this situation,
the Georgia court said:
"If the plaintiff can recover at all, he can do so only upon
an application of the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur.' The occurrence
was unusual. Bottles filled with a harmless and refreshing beverage do not ordinarily explode. When they do, an inference of
negligence somewhere and in somebody may arise. There is no
presumption of law, but merely an inference of fact. Negligence
is not necessarily to be inferred merely from the act itself; but
the tribunal designated by the law to decide the issues of fact
may infere negligence from the happening of an event so
unusual."8 5-

Subsequently many courts have been guilty of a similar logical slide.8"
81. Id. at 313, 223 P.2d at 479.
82. 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951).

83. This point is taken simply to show that the traditional statement 'of the
requirement tends to obscure the inquiry which is logically relevant to fault liability.
There may be, however, another inquiry into the justness and expediency of spreading
the loss irrespective of fault, in relation to which a showing of rarity might be
relevant. See, Fricke, The Use of Expert Evidence in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 5
VIU. L. Rev. 59 (1959).
84. 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
85. Id. at 763, 73 S.E. at 1087. (Emphasis supplied).
86. E.g., Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenburg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 645-46, 64 N.W.2d 226,
234 (1954): Refrigerators do not ordinarily transmit electric current through the
handles so as to severly shock and injure persons who may grasp such handles in
the customary use thereof." Cf., Honea v. City Dairy Milk, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614,
623, 140 P.2d 369, 374 (1943): ". . . glass milk bottles, unless defective, do not
ordinarily break." (Carter, J., dissenting).
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It should be obvious from the foregoing collection of cases that
the strict liability trend is facilitated by the traditional statement of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or, as one writer has well put it, by
the "tendency of the doctrine to focus attention on the fact that carefully made and operated appliances do not in the vast majority of
instances cause injury and to obscure the inquiry whether the majority
of the accidents which occur are due to negligence."
Associated with this tendency, there has been a tendency to assume that the probabilities favor the plaintiff without insisting on
support from expert evidence, even in technical and complicated matters. As Fleming James Jr. has said:
"[T]he propriety of assuming the postulate is clear enough under
the facts of some cases. . . . But the doctrine is probably more
often invoked in practice in run of the mill occurrences where
the facts of the occurrence before the courts are meager .... It is
here the doctrine is most sorely needed and it is here that the
postulates as to probabilities are most often doubtful since most
machines and appliances simply are not foolproof, even when
made and kept and used with reasonable care. By and large
courts have been pretty liberal in responding to this need, though
undoubtedly they have done so only where there.is a fair chance
that the probabilities are as they assume. Moreover they have
been willing to adopt the needed postulate in the widest variety of
situations without requiring expert testimony as to the balance
of probability.""8
To remain faithful to the fault premise, it is submitted that the
courts would have to take the position taken in 1943 by the California
court in this case of Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 9 a case involving the
breaking of a milk bottle. Dealing with the argument that an inference
of negligence in manufacture could be drawn, the court said:
"Nor can the court take judicial notice that glass bottles
are not ordinarily damaged or that defects will not ordinarily
occur unless the bottler is negligent, for the subject is not a
matter of common knowledge. Many of the courts have received
expert testimony to determine the possible or probable causes of
bottle-breakage. . . . An analogy may be found in Judson v.
Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 561, 40 P. 1020, . . . where this
court held relevant and material evidence that dynamite would
87. 2

HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1079 n.16 (1956).
88. Id., at 1081-83 (footnotes omitted); cf., id. at 1079:

"...

the practical

impact . . . of res ipsa loquitur has probably consisted in its tendency to invite
or encourage the assumption of broad and doubtful postulates favorable to liability
in many situations where the courts would otherwise be understandably reluctant to
adopt them, at least without the aid of expert opinion." Cf., Morris, supra note 78,
at 262-63.
89. 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
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not explode if the correct process of manufacturing and handling
were carefully carried out. While it may often .be a matter of
common knowledge that certain articles or substances are not
ordinarily rendered defective in the absence of negligence, we
cannot say that this is true of glass containers." 90
The history of the California bottle cases subsequent to the
Honea case shows another way in which res ipsa tends to erode concepts of fault liability. Once expert evidence has been used and accepted in one case it will be regarded as conclusive in subsequent cases
even though the propositions accepted in the earlier cases are only
doubtfully applicable to the later cases, and even though the result
is that the expert who testified in the earlier case is not subject, in the
later case, to defendant's cross examination by which his earlier statements might be refined to suit the facts of the later case. The
California cases show a startling progression from Gerber v. Faber,9
where recovery was denied, through Honea v. City Dairy, Inc.,92
where in denying recovery the court emphasized the lack of expert
testimony, to Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,93 where the use of

expert testimony changed the result, Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.,94
where the court relied upon the Escola decision even though in the
Gordon case intermediate handlers were involved,9 5 Hoffing v. CocaCola Bottling Co.,96 and Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 7 The last
case represents a high water mark, for the decision is reached via a
discussion in which the court exercises its own native reasoning
powers and speculates to the fullest extent.9"

The foregoing reasons - the tendency of the doctrine to predispose courts to accept evidence of rarity in satisfaction of the first
requirement, the tendency to invite the assumption of doubtful postulates, and the precedent-creating value of cases in which expert testimony has been accepted - explain why the doctrine facilitates the
"drift toward strict liability"99 in negligence cases generally. If the
doctrine has had this effect generally, its influence has been especially
90. Id. at 620, 140 P.2d at 372.
91. 54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942).
92. 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
93. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
94. 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949).
95. See cases cited notes 122-126 infra.
96. 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948).
97. 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952).
98. Id. at 447-49, 247 P.2d at 349-51.
99. The phrase is Professor Noel's; Noel, Manufacturers of Products Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 T1NN. L. Rtv. 963 (1957).
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marked in products liability cases, for various reasons which we will
now consider.' 00
Due to special facts surrounding mass production processes
the delay between manufacture and consumption, and the impossibility
of distinguishing between individual products, or of inquiring, into
the conduct of employees at the time any given product was manufactured - defenses which in other types of res ipsa cases may be
available to the defendant, such as positive explanation absolving the
defendant from responsibility, will not generally be open to the defendant. The defendant will be limited to an assertion that his
processes are up-to-date, i.e., evidence of a general character. He will
rarely be able to do more to offset the effect of plaintiff's evidence than
the defendant in De Lape v. Liggett & Myers Tobbacco Co. was able
to do. In the words of the court in that case:
"All that the defendant has done to offset the effect of the
evidence establishing the defectively manufactured cigarette is to
show the general process of fabricating the brand of cigarette ininvolved, from the receipt of the tobacco at the factories of defendant company until shipment of the finished product therefrom to distributors or dealers. The ingredients used and the
various steps in manufacture are described generally, and it is
stated that the modus operandi is uniform. There is no proof of
the fabrication of the particular package from which the defective
'10
cigarette was taken or of the dangerous cigarette itself."
At this point, the defendant finds himself in a dilemma. The accident may suggest several possible forms of negligence on the part of
the defendant, e.g., sub-standard machinery, deficient testing and inspection processes, or negligence of employees in operating the
machinery. In this type of situation, however, the elimination of one
form of negligence may reinforce the probability of another, i.e.,
negligence of the employees in operating the admittedly efficient system. As Professor James puts it, "The less effective his precautions
to prevent the occurrence the more apt they are to appear negligent;
the more effective the precautions testified to, the less likely they are
0 2
to have been taken in this case since the accident did happen.'
This view was taken at a comparatively early stage in English
law. In Chaproniere v. Mason,' ° 3 plaintiff sued for injuries sustained
100. See Fricke, Of Mice and Men and Unrefreshing Pauses, 3 U. QUEENSLAND
L.J. 321, 325-330 (1959).
101. 25 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
102. 2 HARPER & JAmgS, TORTS 1106 (1956). The text continues: "Indeed the
showing of a foolproof system of precautions demonstrates negligence unless it
succeeds in convincing the trier that no such occurrence ever proceeded from the
defendant."
103. 21 Tasm. L.R. 633 (Austl. 1905).
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when he bit into a stone in a bun manufactured and sold by defendant.
His action was brought in breach of warranty and in negligence. On
the jury's deciding special issues in the defendant's favor, plaintiff
applied successfully for a new trial. In the Court of Appeal, Collins,
M.R. is reported as follows:
"With regard to the second part of the case, the question of
negligence, it was admitted that the principle of res ipsa loquitur
applied. .

.

. The unexplained presence of the stone in the bun

was prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the person
who made the bun. That was admitted, and the defendant produced evidence to rebut this prima facie presumption of negligence. He called witnesses who gave evidence to the effect that
in the manufacture of his buns he made use of a system which
rendered it impossible that a stone should be present in the
dough. One of the witnesses said that it was not feasible, in the
system adopted by the defendant, for a stone to pass into the
dough of which the buns were made. He must have meant that
it was not possible if proper care had been used. This did not rebut
the presumption of negligence, but, on the contrary, it showed
that the system was not properly carried out - that there was
negligence. A stone did get into the dough, and that fact was
evidence that the system followed by the defendant was not carried
out with proper care and skill. There was, therefore, certainly
evidence of negligence causing the injury."' 4
This accords with the predominent view in the United States.
When the matter has arisen, the courts have usually taken the view
that evidence of general care in manufacture will not gain for the
defendant a directed verdict.1 0 5 It is only necessary in a res ipsa case
for the plaintiff to show a preponderant likelihood that the accident
was caused by something for which the defendant would be responsible,
even though the inference is equivocal as to just what the defendant's
specific acts or omissions were. Thus a passenger injured in a derailment may recover damages from the railway company without pinpointing the precise cause of the accident - defect in track, defect in
car, negligence in operation of the car - since it is more probable
than not that the accident was caused by one of these possibilities, and
10 6
the defendant would be responsible for any of these explanations.
104. Id. at 634. (Emphasis supplied). Doubt cast on the possibility invoking
res ipsa in this situation by Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C.
562, 662 (Scot.), would seem to have been resolved by the subsequent decision in
Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85 (P.C. Austl. 1935), although
Daniels v. White, [1938] 4 All E.R. 258, is contra.
105. Cf., PROSSER, LAW Ov TORTS 216 (2d ed. 1955) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
1106 (1956).
106. James v. Boston Elevated Ry., 204 Mass. 158, 90 N.E. 513 (1910) ; cf.,
discussion in 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1071-72 (1956); cf., also, Foltis, Inc. v.
City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 123, 38 N.E.2d 455, 463-64 (1941).
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In the type of case with which we are concerned, the two most likely
explanations are inadequate machinery and negligence on the part of
employees operating the machinery. For either of these causes of the
accident the defendant would be responsible. When the defendant
seeks to eliminate the former explanation, he may make the case
against him even more damning. Sometimes it is simply said that
such evidence "does not eliminate" the possibility of negligent conduct on the part of the defendant's servants.' °7 In other cases the
courts have gone so far as to say such evidence emphasizes the latter
possibility:
"The full evidence as to the modern equipment of the plant and
the details of operation, including inspection both before and
after filling the bottle, serve rather to emphasize than to disprove negligence of some employee in passing into the market
a bottle containing the articles disclosed in the evidence."' 0 8
A typical discussion is contained in the opinion in Richenbacher v.
California Packing Corp.:10

"The statement of the defendant as to the manner the
spinach is handled in the factory before it is placed in sealed
cans for sale and distribution for human consumption did not
establish that it is impossible that the glass was in the can when
it was sealed, but only that it was not feasible if proper care
were used and the servants of the defendant were not negligent
in working out the system. The fact that the glass got into the
can during the preparation of the spinach and before the can was
sealed, notwithstanding the great care . . . which was customarily used in canning spinach, was a ...circumstance which

warranted an inference that some person whose duty it was to
see that the system was observed was negligent in the examination
of the contents of the can before it was sealed, if not negligent in
preventing the presence of glass at a place where it could be put
or might fall into the can."
There are a small group of cases where the introduction of evidence
of general care in manufacture gained for the defendant a directed
verdict. After mentioning these cases, Prosser comments:
"The correctness of these decisions seems open to question. As
the defendant's evidence approaches definite proof that the defect
107. E.g., Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co., 126 Conn. 659, 663, 13 A.2d 757,

759 (1940).

108. Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 303, 116 So. 147, 148 (1928).
109. 250 Mass. 198, 202-03, 145 N.E. 281, 282 (1924) ; a similarity between
this passage and that quoted from the English Court of Appeal, 21 Tasm. L.R. 633
(Austl. 1905), may be detected.
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could not be present, it is all the more clearly rebutted by the
fact that the defect is there."' 10
Another commentator refers to the same group of cases and offers the
comment:
"Most of the confusion at this point arises from a failure
to distinguish between the general care the defendant exercised
over a period of time and over a wide range of operations, and the
care he used at the particular time and place. There is also some
tendency to forget the normal . . . priciple of respondeat su-

perior."''
This criticism has been persuasive with most of the courts. The
cases which gave judgment for the defendant are all over twenty years
old, and in 1950 it was possible for one commentator to say that:
"An examination of the cases of this type reported during the
last five years reveals none in which the defendant's showing of
due care used in manufacturing has been declared sufficient as a
matter of law in the face of a finding that the food or2 beverage
was unwholesome and caused injury to the plaintiff.""1

The courts have gone even further in imposing what amounts to
strict liability in the "exploding bottle" situation. In a broad sense,
perhaps, the courts are applying fault concepts. They differentiate the
situation where a soft drink has been lying in the retailer's refrigerator
for a considerable time". from that in which the accident occurs
immediately after delivery of the bottle by defendant; they den recovery where there is some likelihood that a sudden change of temperature caused the accident ;114 and they place significance in the fact that
the bottle has undergone much handling and was exposed to many
opportunities for rough usage weakening its walls"" - all rational
criteria resulting from the application of fault concepts. But it is
equally true that there are many departures from this broad division
110. PROSStR, TORTs 216 n.23 (2d ed. 1955); The text continues: "If he [defendant] testifies that he used proper care ...to keep defunct mice and wandering
insect life out of his bottled beverage, the fact that ...bug was in the bottle, with
the background of common experience that such things do not usually happen if
proper care is used, may permit reasonable men to find that his witnesses are not
to be believed, that the precautions described were not sufficient to conform to the
standard required or were not faithfully carried out, and that the whole truth
has not been told."
111. DICKERSON, PRODUCTs LIABILITY AND THe FOOD CONSUMER 127 (1951).
112. King, Evidence & Presumptions in Food Products Liability, 5 Fool)-DRUG
Cosm. L.J. 513, 524 (1950).
113. Dunn v.Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (1941).
114. Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d 952
(1937) ; Wheeler v.Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916).
115. Berkens v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 140, 122 P.2d 884
(1942).
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and many cases imposing liability cannot be explained satisfactorily
in terms of proven fault.
Possible causes of exploding bottles include such occurrences as
sudden changes in temperature causing unequal expansion of different
parts of the glass, overcharging of gas, defectively manufactured
bottles, inadequate system of inspection for defects, excessive shaking
on a hot day, and mishandling in transportation weakening the
fabric of the bottle." 6 These are not, of course, equal probabilities.
Now, in the situation where the defendant does his own delivering, and
the accident happens shortly after defendant's employee has delivered
the bottles, and the plaintiff can give evidence, possibly with supporting
testimony, that the bottles were inaccessible to others and the particular bottle was carefully handled immediately prior to the accident,
it may be true to say that the possibilities favor the plaintiff's claim
that the defendant has been negligent in some way, whether in manufacture, carbonation, inspection or transportation. There are many
such cases where recovery has been justifiably allowed, and in some
of them the courts have placed express emphasis on such factors as
7
the proximity in time of the delivery to the accident.1
There are, however, an increasing number of cases where despite
the intervention of third party delivery men, the courts have allowed
recovery after the plaintiff has provided "affirmative proof" of careful
handling subsequent to' the bottles' leaving the defendant's factory.
These call for closer consideration.
It is a truism that res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where the occurrence of the accident is equally consistent with causes which do
not connote the defendant's negligence as with those for which the
defendant would be responsible."' Some exploding bottle cases involving plural distributors have denied recovery to the plaintiff on the
116. Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 161-62 (1953); cf.,
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing, Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 517, 203 P.2d 522, 524 (1949) ; Escola
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 459, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944); Stodder
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 142 Me. 139, 143, 48 A.2d 622, 624 (1946) ; Fick
v. Pilsener Brewing Co., 86 N.E.2d 616, 620 (C.P. Ohio 1949); Loch v. Confair,
372 Pa. 212, 217, 93 A.2d 451, 453-54 (1953).
117. E.g., Starke Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Carrington, 159 Fla. 718, 32 So. 2d
583 (1947); Lawton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shaughnessy, 202 Okla. 610, 216
P.2d 579 (1950); Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226
(1954). Cf., Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952);
Groves v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949); Fick v.
Pilsener Brewing Co., 86 N.E.2d 616 (C.P. Ohio 1949); Joly v. Jones, 115 Vt. 174,
55 A.2d 181 (1947).
118. Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 206 F.2d
171
(10th Cir. 1953); Pena v. Stewart, 78 Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892 (1955); Niklas v.
Metz, 359 Mo. 601, 222 S.W.2d 795 (1949); Mercatante v. City of New York,
286 App. Div. 265, 142 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1955).
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basis of such a proposition." 9 The experience and findings of experts
suggests that these causes are more consistent with the fault principle
that those which in similar situations have allowed recovery, even
though the latter cases purport to insist on an affirmative showing of
due care by the plaintiff. According to Dingwall,
"Examination of a very large number of bottles including
those involved in personal injuries and alleged to have been caused
by the bottle 'exploding' lead to the conclusion that bottles in the
soft drink industry do not break because of internal pressure
alone. About fifty per cent of them break because they were
struck a blow no normal bottle could withstand. About forty five
per cent break because they were struck but the bottles are already
so weakened that they fail to withstand normal handling. This
weakening is produced by damaging the internal surface of the
bottle. About three per cent break because they are damaged by
the machine that places the cap on the bottle. The bottle is
cracked at that time and subsequent efforts to remove the cap
causes the bottle to break. About two per cent break because the
bottles are defective due to manufacturing defects that had not
been discovered by the inspectors of the glass manufacturer.''12
It would therefore seem that if the plaintiff is suing a bottler who
does not make his own deliveries, and shows simply the fact of the
accident, he should be non-suited. Courts which have allowed such
cases to go to the jury have attempted to reconcile their decisions with
theories of fault liability by purporting to insist on an affirmative showing of due care on the part of all handlers subsequent to the time the
bottle left the defendant's hands. It is true that if it is possible to
exclude the possibility of negligence on the part of the intervening
handlers, the residual inference that the manufacturer was negligent
would then become an eminently reasonable one. Despite the view of
experts that the "explosion" of a bottle without impact is virtually
impossible, 2 ' courts have been extremely liberal in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff has "affirmatively excluded" the possibility of
the accident being due to subsequent mishandling.
How does one "affirmatively exclude" the possibility of the accident being due to rough handling by intervening carriers? According
119. E.g., Berkens v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 140, 122 P.2d
884 (1942); Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d
575 (1948). Cf., Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d
952 (1937).
120. Dingwall, supra note 116, at 161-62.
121. Dingwall, supra note 116, at 164*: "For either a beer or a soft drink bottle
at room temperature to 'explode', that is, break from internal pressure alone, then
the strength of the bottle must be only about 70 pounds per square inch, gage. So
poor a bottle is impossible to visualize."
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to a recent California case, this may be done by introducing evidence
that the carrier's trucks were not involved in any accidents during the
month of delivery:
"Tracing the case containing the bottle which exploded from
the defendant's plant to his hand the plaintiff introduced evidence
to the effect that it suffered no damage at any stage of its transportation.... Evidence was presented which showed that La Salle
trucks were not involved in accidents during August, 1944; that
no accidents occurred in the Associated warehouse that month
which might have affected the beer; that the driver who delivered
the case to the plaintiff was not involved in an accident en route
and did not bump the case; that is was in excellent condition
on delivery,
and that the plaintiff handled the case and bottle
1 22
carefully."'
The unsatisfactory character of such evidence in rebutting the very
strong inference that the accident was caused by some impact in the
course of delivery is obvious: such evidence does not exclude the
possibility of rough handling short of an accident, e.g., in the course
of loading and unloading. We are all aware that truck drivers who
deliver bottles of soft drink do not handle their products with great
delicacy. 123 The Gordon case is a particularly glaring example of the
abandonment of fault liability for two other reasons which are brought
out in the concurring judgment of Justice Traynor. In the first place,
even assuming that evidence of absence of accidents excludes the possibility of intervening negligence, the "proof" of no accidents was extremely tenuous. The manager of the distributing company called
by the plaintiff claimed he would have knowledge of any accidents
which might have occurred during that month, but on cross examination he admitted that accidents were not normally reported to him.
He even went so far as to say that accidents were frequent.' 2 4 Secondly,
although the majority say that "it was the jury's province to determine,
after being properly instructed, whether the plaintiff had sufficiently
proved the absence of intervening harmful forces after the defendant
shipped the bottle,' 25 it is clear from the instructions, quoted in the
122. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 517, 203 P.2d 522, 524-25
(1949).
123. "It is common knowledge that bottled beverages are transported and handled
with abandon." Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 40 Del. 97, 5 A.2d 516 (1939).
124. "There isn't any time that there isn't a bottle or two broken in the case.
There is always something broken on account of handling it." Gordon v. Aztec
Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 518, 203 P.2d 522, 525 (1949).
125. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra, note 124.
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concurring judgment, that the issue of the adequacy of the plaintiff's
exclusion of intervening forces was not even left to the jury, but was
126
concluded peremptorily by the trial court.
Indeed, it seems obvious from the talk of public policy which constantly recurs in opinions, 2 7 that courts are designedly imposing
strict liability as a means of ensuring that soft drink manufacturers
take consummate precautions. As a Kansas court has indicated, the
possibility of danger reflected in the volume of litigation makes it
important that the highest degree of care be exercised by those who
engage in the business of beverage manufacture. 28 The vacillation and
inconsistencies of different jurisdictions do not seem to proceed on the
basis of rational fault differentia, so much as the predisposition of
each particular jurisdiction to impose strict liability - California in
this respect being the most progressive. While it is possible to justify
on a fault basis some cases involving claims brought against manufacturers who make their own deliveries, 129 and some recent cases which
allow an action joining each member in the chain of distribution,'3 °
it is difficult to justify the cases which allow the plaintiff to get to the
jury on a showing that the accident was not caused by intermediate
handlers. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the liberality with
which the courts accept plaintiffs' "affirmative proof" in such cases betrays a desire to impose liability on manufacturers irrespective of fault
- unless one can say that the bottles are defective, and give rise to
responsibility in the manufacturer, if they are not made strong enough
to withstand the rough handling they customarily receive. 131 These
cases stand in sharp contrast to other cases involving the possibility of
126. See Traynor, J., dissenting and concurring in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing
Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 524 n.1, 203 P.2d 522, 528 n.1 (1949), and cf., footnote 2 in
the same opinion quoting the intermediate court: "It is to be noted that nowhere in
these later instructions did the court direct the jury that it must find the indicated
facts to be true before the supposed inference of negligence might be applied to the
defendant .... "
127. E.g., Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925);
Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918).
128. Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601
(1941).
129. See cases cited note 117 supra.
130. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) ; Nichols v. Nold,
174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) ; Loch v, Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
131. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 531-32, 203 P.2d 522, 534
(1949) ; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). Cf.,
view expressed in Fick v. Pilsener Brewing Co., 86 N.E.2d 616, 621 (C.P. Ohio
1949), that the bottler is required to anticipate changes in temperature arising from
normal and customary refrigeration practices. Accordingly the bottler "owed the
duty to furnish glass containers of sufficient tensile strength to withstand such anticipated changes in temperature."
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intervening mishandling.' 3 2 As with the "foreign substance" cases,
one also finds courts readily condoning the failure of the plaintiff to
utilize the best available evidence. Dingwall'" suggests that the pieces
of the exploded bottle be kept, examined and introduced into evidence
in order to throw light on the cause of the explosion, but there seems
to be only one case where any importance is attached to the plaintiff's
failure to do this.'
Once again, the indulgence suggests that a deliberate policy is being pursued.
To summarize, then, it is clear that there are many ways in which
the res ipsa device tends to have an erosive effect on concepts of fault
liability. It does so,
(a) generally,
(1) by predisposing courts to accept evidence of rarity in satisfaction of the requirement that the accident indicate a probability of the defendant's negligence;
(2) by inviting the assumption of broad and doubtful probability
postulates favorable to liability, and reducing the likelihood
that the court will insist on expert testimony;
(3) by attaching to propositions advanced by experts and accepted
in earlier cases, the reverence of precedents, invulnerable
from review;
(b) and specifically, in relation to products liability cases,
(1) by allowing the plaintiff to get to the jury in foreign substance cases, no matter how strong the defendant's evidence of
general care and precautions;
(2) by indulgent acceptance of evidence designed to exclude the
possibility of intermediate mishandling in exploding bottle
cases.
Since the second requirement of exclusive control may pose special
problems in this area, it will be briefly mentioned. If it is interpreted
literally, as some courts have thought it should be,' this requirement
132. E.g., Hart v. Emery Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118
S.W.2d 509 (1938), where the falling of an awning from a shop counter was held
not to justify an inference that the defendant had negligently stacked the awnings
on the counter, since other customers had access to the awnings.
133. Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 160-61 (1953).
134. Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 67, 68 P.2d 952,
959 (1937) : "The five pieces into which the bottle was blown were in the possession
of the plaintiffs up to the day of the trial but they made no effort at that time to
prove by experts or otherwise that an examination of these, either separately or
when put together as a bottle, disclosed any defects, such as thin spots or bubbles . . .
135. E.g., Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
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has the effect of preventing res ipsa from ever being used in a case
of products liability for the product will always be in the exclusive
control of the victim, not the manufacturer, at the time it causes injury. Some courts have modified the severity of this requirement by
only requiring exclusive control at the time of the negligent act which in this type of case will precede the plaintiff's injury - but
the better view would seem to be to abandon the requirement as a
universal test.1 7 It is true that the plaintiff must show not only that
the facts indicate negligence, but that they indicate that the defendant
was negligent. 13 It is also true that a showing that (1) more often
than not the accidents of this type are attributable to the negligence of
those in control, and (2) the defendant was in exclusive control of
the instrumentality, is one way of tying the negligence to the defendant.
But there are other ways of doing this, such as the method adopted in,
some recent California cases already discussed, namely of showing
(1) more often than not such accidents are attributable to ,gomebody's
negligence, (2) then eliminating the other possibilities by affirmatively
showing care on the part of the subsequent handlers, leaving the inference that the defendant was negligent. 13 9 While it has been suggested
that some of these cases have gone too far in accepting flimsy evidence
of the second aspect, these cases place the element of control in its
proper perspective. The important thing is some proof connecting the
inference of negligence with the defendant, and the exclusive control
technique is only one way of doing this, but is not itself an independent
requirement.
III.

MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY IN WARRANTY

It should be obvious from the foregoing section that the common
law in products liability has been exhibiting a gradual trend toward
strict liability over the last hundred years. At any one point during
this period the change is imperceptible since it has been and is being
effected in the manner typical of common law - gradual change under
a cloak of continuity. This change may be seen against a background
of changing philosophical climate, which has brought new public
policies to the foreground. These policies and the effectiveness of the
law's arsenal of weapons to secure them will be examined in due course,
136. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
137. Cf., PROSSER, LAW Ov TORTS 206 (2d ed. 1955).
138. E.g., Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 83 Cal. App. 2d 210, 188 P.2d 513 (1948).
139. E.g., Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 443, 247 P.2d 344,
350 (1952) : The control requirement's "use is merely to aid the courts in determining
whether, under the general rule, it is more probable than not that the injury was
the result of the defendant's negligence."
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but a brief inquiry into the philosophical background which has made
courts more ready to impose strict liability will now be made, not
for any purpose of barren intellectual satisfaction, but because this
change is currently affecting the thinking of the judges, and is therefore one element in the predictive process which lawyers must undertake.
Seavey has sketched the outlines of this development very capably:
"In determining whether there is tort liability when harm
has been caused, the focal point of conflict has been whether one
should be liable for harm irrespective of fault. The law has been
in a state of flux in its desire to protect the two basic interests of
individuals - the interest in security and the interest in freedom
of action. The protection of the first requires that a person who
has been harmed as a result of the activity of another should be
compensated by the other irrespective of his fault; the protection
of the second requires that a person who harms another should
be required to compensate the other only when his activity was
intentionally wrongful or indicated an undue lack of consideration for the interests of others. At any given time and place the
law is the resultant derived from the competition between these
two basic concepts.
Primitive law stressed security. In the eighteenth century,
under the influence of doctrines of natural law and of laissez faire,
emphasis was placed upon freedom of action, and culpability
tended to be the basis for tort liability. Nineteenth-century jurisprudence referred all legal problems to the idea of free will ...
[I]n common-law countries an attempt was made to state the
entire law of torts in terms of culpability. Towards the end of
the century, however, juristic thinking recognized that there
should be a two-fold basis for the law of torts and that, in
striking a balance to determine what most nearly satisfies the
needs of, all both the concept of 1security
and that of culpability
40
must be used in varying degrees.'

The pattern of development seems to be cyclical, similar to the
recurrence and disappearance of the caveat emptor philosophy. 141
Starting with the medieval period, the wheel seems now to be approaching full circle with an emphasis on compensation and security, while
the interest in commercial freedom of action is minimized. Dealing
with the enterprise theory, by which liability is regarded as a normal
business or operating expense similar to raw materials, Granville
Williams comments: "That this attitude has come into prominence
140. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. RPv. 72, 73-74 (1942).
141. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133

(1931).
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in the present century, though not unknown in the last, is symptomatic
of the general search for security at the cost, if need be, of freedom of
enterprise."14' 2
This general philosophical climate has shaped a new public policy
of strict liability which has two main aspects, deterrence and socialization of losses. These twin aspects of the new public policy are mentioned in the opinion of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
1 43

Co.

"Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others,
as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defecti've
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture
of the product, is responsible for its reaching the
144
market."
Let us examine each of these aspects separately.

Deterrence
It is clear from statements made by nineteenth century judges
that the development of warranties represented a little piece of social
engineering on the part of the court; that they were consciously setting
out to elevate the standards of manufacture by imposing sanctions
on the manufacturer of defective products. Especially illuminating are
the words of Chief Justice Best in Jones v. Bright:.4
"It is the duty of the Court, in administering the law, to lay
down rules calculated to prevent fraud; to protect persons who are
necessarily ignorant of the qualities of a commodity they purchase;
142. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEM,
137, 152 (1951).
143. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1950).
144. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (concurring opinion); cf., Jacob E. Decker
& Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 621-22 164 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1942).
145. 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
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and to make it the interest of manufacturers and those who sell,
to furnish the best article that can be supplied."' 46
Compare his later observation:
"[T]he case is of great importance; because it will teach manufacturers that they must not aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality, and that the law will protect
purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of the commodity
sold."' 47
148
Today's judges are rarely as outspoken as Chief Justice Best,
but one may speculate that in encouraging the trend toward strict
liability outside of privity they are similarly motivated in part by a
desire to improve manufacturing standards for reasons of safety. This
is what Dean Leon Green calls the prophylactic factor. 4 '
To what extent, however, is it possible to achieve the deterrent
aim by imposing strict liability? Salmond thought that nobody could
be deterred "by a threat of punishment from doing harm which he did

not intend and which he did his best to avoid. .

.

. There is no more

reason why I should insure other persons against the harmful results
of my own activities, in the absence of any mens rea on my part, than
why I should insure them against the inevitable accidents which result to them from the forces of nature independent of human actions altogether."' 50 While this language is loaded, especially the phrase
"which he did his best to avoid," the suggestion that fault liability
is consistent with the deterrent aim, but strict liability is not, wears at
first the appearance of sweet reasonableness.
On reflection, however, it loses much of its force. As Granville
Williams points out, this reasoning ignores the subsconscious
factors: "there is something that tends to make us remember
the things we want to remember and to forget the things we
5
want to forget. The threat of punishment may aid the memory.' '
There are other reasons for believing, contrary to what a priori reasoning might at first suggest, that the deterrent aim is better served
by strict than by fault liability. Professor James makes the important
146. Id. at 542-43, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1171.
147. Id. at 546, 130 ]Eng. Rep. at 1173.
148. See, however, Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 580, 50 N.W.2d
162, 165 (1951), Bushnell, J.: "The purpose of the doctrine of implied warranty
of fitness for use is to promote high standards in business and to discourage sharp
dealings ....
"
149. Green, Duty Problem in Negligence Cases II, 29 COLUM. L. Riv. 255, 256
n.3 (1929).
150. SALMOND, TORTS 12-13 (6th ed. 1924), 18-19 (10th ed. 1945) ; cf., A. Hand,
Judge, in Valleri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
151. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRSNT LEGAL PROBLEMS,
137, 161 (1951).
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point that strict liability places pressure on organized groups, which
are in a position to undertake large accident prevention campaigns:
"The accident problem calls for . . . steps which will cut down
accidents ....
Studies of the human behavior that causes accidents

show that such conduct is not by and large marked by individual
ethical or moral shortcoming. It also appears that the most effective steps towards accident prevention have been taken by
institutions and organized groups rather than by persons acting
as unorganized individuals. In the problem at hand, for instance,
the manufacturer is in a peculiarly strategic position to improve
the safety of his products, so that the pressure of strict liability
could scarcely be exerted at a better point if accident prevention is
1
to be furthered by tort law. ' 52
Dickerson is another who believes that strict liability is a more effective
deterrent than fault liability. In his words:
"To hold the defendant to a standard of 'due care' is to
encourage only his keeping abreast of existing technology. To
hold him absolutely accountable is to put pressure on him to better
those standards. This is borne out by the experience of the
X Dairy. On the firing line of ordinary claim settlement many
food companies feel impelled to make a settlement whenever the
claimant's injury is property laid at their door. The virtual
absolute liability which thus exists for small
claims induced the
' 153
X Dairy to replace the 'best' with better.

The difficulty of establishing foresight may also be a practical reason
for imposing strict liability, especially in the area of products liability.
Of course, it is difficult to prove any of these things, but the observation of those who have witnessed factories in operation both before
and after Factories Act type legislation supports the suggestion that
strict liability is effective to deter. Many people are convinced that
since the enactment of this and workmen's compensation legislation,
employers are taking safety precautions which were not taken before
such legislation, and the drop in the industrial fatality rate since the
passage of those acts has been truly remarkable - it was cut by half
between the two world wars."" It may therefore be speculated that
the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer by providing a
direct warranty action against it would reinforce the sanctions of
152. James, General Products - Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligencef, 24 TENN. L. Rev. 923 (1957). The omitted footnotes refer to 2 HARPER
& JAMEs, TORTS 729-58 (1956), which contains an extended discussion of this subject, and which states more fully the basis for Professor James's belief that strict
liability deters.
153.

cf.,

DICKERSON,

PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER

DICKERSON, op. cit. supra at 253-54;
154. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 757

261-62 (1951);

cf., Noel, supra note 99 at 1011.
n.22 (1956).
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ad hoc legislative devices such as pure food regulations by providing a
stronger inducement to set the law's machinery in motion - the victim
who stands to gain from the outcome of the litigation has a stronger
inducement to sue than the police have to prosecute. In relation to
products not governed by such legislation the private action would
further the policy reflected in this type of legislation.
If it is objected that allowing manufacturers to take out products
liability insurance is inconsistent with this suggested deterrent aim,
so that such contracts should be void as against public policy, then
the answer is that deterrence is not completely abandoned by allowing
such contracts: insurance companies have their own methods of discouraging the expensive client, such as no-claim bonuses and raising
or refusing coverage. There are also the factors of inconvenience and
adverse publicity. The process of establishing guilt publicly may deter
even though an insurer pays for the damage inflicted.
Socialization of losses or better risk bearer approach.
The current philosophical climate with its emphasis on security
and compensation has paved the way for an approach which takes into
account the relative financial capacity of each party to withstand the
loss represented by the plaintiff's injury. In determining whether the
loss should be shifted from the plaintiff's shoulders to those of the
defendant, courts will be affected by the knowledge that the defendant
is in a strong position to absorb such a loss.
This is not, of course, the sort of argument that can be addressed
to a court in an individual case. The suggestion that the defendant
should pay because he is richer than the plaintiff would offend notions
of democracy and fairness. The idea is rather that some account be
given to the class of person represented by each party.'5 5 If defendant
is engaged in an activity which over a period of time is bound to
cause injuries to others, sound accounting policy dictates that he should
make reserves for such possibilities or take out insurance against such
risks. It does not offend one's sense of fairness that he should regard
such normal business hazards as part of the cost of manufacture much
the same as other overhead expenses, especially if the average victim
of these operations is not likely to be in a position to cope adequately
with the financial shock of such injuries. This is eminently true of
the situations with which we are concerned where manufacturers will
almost always be superior riskbearers." 6 They will normally carry
155. Cf., MORRIS, TORTS 248-49 (1953).
156. Cf., Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss in Tort Cases, 78 U.
811-14 (1930).

PA.
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products liability insurance which will affect pricing and so be passed
on to consumers, spread so thin that no one will be seriously affected.
While this type of analysis has undoubtedly affected the thinking
of the courts, predisposing them to impose strict liability, there has
been little articulation of the importance of this factor in the opinions.' 57
These general considerations combine with factors such as advertising, which create a more direct relationship between manufacturer
and consumer, 158 and the realization that the series of actions to which
the privity requirement may lead is a wasteful process' 59 to create pressures toward the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer,
giving the ultimate consumer a direct action against the manufacturer.
But the means employed to achieve this result have been diverse.
Perhaps the least fictitious of the devices used has been the
enforcement of express warranties created by advertising. Some courts
have referred to the development of advertising and trade marks as
changing the commercial milieu and creating the need for new legal
rules.' 60 Courts using this device have been able to utilize the advertising material more directly. It is well established that statements of
fact contained in advertisements may constitute express warranties.
The difficulty about this, however, is that in today's commercial
structure there will rarely appear to be any contractual relationship
between the consumer and the manufacturer. The Uniform Sales Act
talks of the relationship between "seller" and "buyer". Some courts
have met this difficulty squarely, stating that they regard the privity
157. Cf., Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. Rtv. 401,

437 & n.71 (1958).
158. It has often been suggested that the privity requirement developed
fortuitously. Originally a breach of warranty was conceived of as tortious, Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888) comparable to the action
of deceit, except, however, for the requirement of scienter. A century after the first
use of the warranty action, some lawyers introduced the method of declaring on a
warranty in indebitatus assumpsit. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep.
15 (1778). This method was more frequently used, so that during the nineteenth
century the courts came to regard warranty as a purely contractual obligation, with
the concomitant requirement of privity. In that, different, commercial and industrial
milieu, manufacturer was usually also vendor, so that the assumption that privity
was required, induced by the fact that privity was nearly always present, may not
have caused much hardship. With the increasing development of modern marketing
and distribution arrangements during the nineteenth century, the hardship of such
a requirement became more noticeable, The development of national advertising and
trademark practices have created a "vacuum" between manufacturer and consumer, the
latter relying more and more on the former's representations and general reputation.
Opinions often refer to the impact of advertising in giving the consumer a direct
action against the manufacturer. See e.g., Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 221 La. 919, 924-25, 60 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (1952) ; Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 619, 164 S.W.2d 828, 832 (1942); cf., Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 442-43 (1944).
159. The warranty action against the retailer, with actions over, led to the
accumulation of costs way out of proportion to the value of the original suit in Kasler
& Cohen v. Slavonski, [1928] 1 K.B. 78.
160. See note 158 supra.
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requirement as anachronistic, and refuse to apply the requirement,
emphasizing the ability of the modern manufacturer to obtain the
psychological effect of representation by advertising:
"Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast
changes have taken place in the economic structures of the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great transition. Radio, billboards, and the products of
the printing press have become the means of creating a large part
of the demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the
ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that
would permit manufacturers of goods to create a demand for
their products by representing that they possess qualities which
they, in fact, do not possess, and then, because there is no privity
of contract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer,
deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result from
the absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily
noticeable.'161
Although the Baxter doctrine did not find immediate acceptance,
and has indeed been given a restrictive application in the jurisdiction of
its birth,'6 2 there are more recent indications that the doctrine is growing in acceptance. We have already seen that the Supreme Court of
Ohio has recently accepted such a doctrine in Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co. 16 3 A more recent opinion of the Second Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals contains extensive discussion of the
problem as well as the decision announced in the Rogers case. That
was the case of Arfons v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 1 64 where,
prior to the Rogers decision, the lower court had arbitrarily rejected
the contention that an action might lie against a manufacturer for
breach of express warranty. The place of sale was uncertain, but the
federal court dealt with the case on the assumption that the plaintiff
could establish that Ohio law was applicable:
"Assuming that appellant can demonstrate the applicability of
Ohio law we turn now to the question of whether that law would
permit recovery in the absence of privity. This leads in turn to
an examination of recent far-reaching changes in the Ohio law
of warranties.
161. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 462-63, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932);
cf., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939)
cf., 1 WILLISTON, SAL9S § 244 (a) (rev. ed. 1948). See also, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
162. Cf., Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25- Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642
(1946) ; Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P.2d 642 (1940).
163. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
164. 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958).
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In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 1958, 167 Ohio St.
244, 147 N.E.2d 612, decided after Judge Smith's decision below,
the Supreme Court of Ohio reassessed the requirement of privity
in express warranty cases. After a searching inquiry into the history of the rule and the relevant policy considerations, the
privity requirement was rejected as inconsistent with the true
relationships between manufacturer and consumer created by
modern advertising and merchandising methods.
The rationale of the Rogers case is clear. In recent years
an increasing number of manufacturers have made their principal appeal directly to the ultimate purchaser through extensive and
effective advertising. We know that a given article may pass
through several hands after it leaves the factory and that the
retailers or middle-men are mere 'conduits . . . through which
the manufacturer distributes his goods.' Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., supra, 147 N.E.2d at page 615. Thus, the consumer has come to rely more and more upon the representations
and reputation of the manufacturer and less and less upon those
of the retailer. This reliance is particularly justified where the
articles are either sold in sealed containers or are otherwise of
such a nature that no consumer could reasonably rely upon anyone
but the manufacturer to detect or prevent latent defects.
The Rogers case permits the consumer to look to the manufacturer to make good losses caused by defective products, where
the sale or use of the product was induced by representations
directed by the manufacturer to the consumer. In taking this
forward step the Ohio court recognized that, in this modern
society, laws which fitted the needs of other times must be adjusted to keep pace with society's growth and present needs.
Clearly, the key relationship is one between producer and buyer.
The retailer is in the unhappy position of being governed, in the
selection of many products which he sells, by consumer pressure
generated by manufacturer advertising.' 65 In addition the manufacturer is in the best position to minimize the possibility of latent
defects.
We do not read the Rogers case as merely another step along
a well travelled road. That decision blazed a new trail
166 in Ohio
and the court acknowledged as much in its opinion.
Although, of course, the federal court is merely applying Ohio law,
it may be significant that the opinion contains overtones of approval.
Other courts have not felt able to take this bold step, but have managed to enforce the warranty arising from the advertising statements by
165. This is sometimes referred to in economic and commercial circles as the
"vacuum concept"; cf., note 158 supra. (author's footnote).
166. Arfons v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir.
1958), (footnotes omitted), presumably this cause of action is confined to situations
of personal injury. See Jordan v. Brower, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
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a careful process of reasoning. Accepting the privity requirement, they
have nevertheless been able to spell out a contractual relationship
between the manufacturer and consumer, based on the consideration,
on the one hand that the purchaser shall buy the manufacturer's product, and on the other hand that the product shall possess the qualities
claimed for it in the advertisement:
"It is true that a warranty of personalty does not run with the
article warranted. But a manufacturer may warrant his products
to ultimate purchasers. In this day of progressive and highly
competitive business, a warranty of his product by a manufacturer
to the ultimate purchaser of his product may be intended by the
manufacturer as an added inducement to the ultimate purchaser
to buy the product of that manufacturer rather than that of his
competitor. The consideration for such a warranty would be
the purchase by the ultimate purchaser of that manufacturer's
product, which is in effect a direct purchase as it would have been
if the purchaser had bought from an agent of the manufacturer
instead of an independent dealer or contractor. .

.

. Generally the

law doesnot bridge the gap between the manufacturer and ultimate
purchasers by implying warranties, but it throws up no barrier
preventing a manufacturer from . . . making a contract with an

ultimate consumer to guarantee an article sold to the latter, directly or indirectly, if the elements of intention to contract, and
consideration are present, as they are in this case."' 67
This analysis would seem to be correct. Even though warranty
has come to be regarded as contractual, the supporting contract does not
have to be a contract of sale. 6 ' The existence of a contract between
the purchaser and his dealer does not prevent the coexistence of a contract between the purchaser and the manufacturer.' 6 9 A unilateral
contract may exist between the manufacturer and consumer based on
167. Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 783-84, 62 S.E.2d 198, 201-02
(1950) ; cf., 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 161 at § 244 (a).
168. Note, 2 VAND. L. Rev. 765 (1949). Some recent English cases make this
clear. Brown v. Sheen & Richmond Car Sales, Ltd., [1950] 1 All E.R. 1102 (hirepurchase of used car - formal arrangement a sale from dealer to finance company, and a hire-purchase from finance company to plaintiff, who successfully enforced an express warranty against the dealer) ; Shanklin Pier, Ltd. v. Detel
Products, Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 854 (plaintiffs, pier owners, who had contracted with
X to have X paint their pier, with the right to specify the paint to be used, contacted defendants, paint manufacturers; latter informed plaintiffs that certain type
paint would suit plaintiffs' special needs, so plaintiffs specified that X use that paint.
Defendants sold paint to X 'who used it on the pier. When it proved unsuitable,
plaintiffs sued defendants) ; cf., U.S. Pipe & Foundary Co. v. City of Waco, 130
Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 433 (1937).
169. See cases cited note 168 supra; see also Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax

Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391, 393 (3d Cir. 1932): ".

.

. Climax Company overlooks the

possibility of the manufacturer contracting with both the dealer and the consumer."
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the benefit derived by the manufacturer from the purchase.17 ° It is
therefore submitted that proper analysis, supported by well-established
authorities, justifies the position taken by the court in the Studebaker
case.171 It also has the advantage that it develops the reliance concept,
long the basis of commercial doctrines in this area, to conform to
changes effected by modern marketing and advertising practices.
But while this approach may be more conceptually acceptable it
is also more limited, confining the right of action to those in the chain
of distribution in circumstances where advertising has induced reliance
on the claims of the manufacturer. For this reason the approach
taken in these cases has been regarded as unnecessarily restrictive by
those more concerned with the grave problem of accident compensation - a problem which is thought to transcend the question of reasonable commercial expectations. Fleming James, Jr. is the vanguard
of this line of thinking:
"While these considerations may have some relevance in a commercial context, they are makeweight factors at most in a context of strict liability for physical injuries. It would be a pity
that they should emerge as requirements, or limitations on liability under an implied warranty. If injury from defective products is properly a risk of the producer's enterprise, it should be so
whether he advertised or not and whether or not there was a
conscious need to rely on his skill. In either
event it is the maker
' 1 72
who creates the risk and reaps the profit.'

It is this feeling that "the remedies of injured consumers ought
'
not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales"173
that has led some courts to abhor the path of fiction in reaching the
desired position of manufacturer's strict liability, and to "fix that
responsibility openly.

'174

As the Supreme Court of Texas said in

Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Clapp:17 5 "We believe the better and
sounder rule places liability solidly on the ground of warranty not in
contract, but imposed by law as a matter of public policy."
170. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (advertisement offering to pay $100 to anybody contracting influenza after using smoke ball;
plaintiff bought defendant's smoke ball from retailer, nevertheless contracted influenza
after using the ball as instructed, and successfully maintained action against manufacturer); see also, Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., supra note 169.
171. This reasoning has been developed at greater length by the present writer;
see, Fricke, Manufacturers Warranty, 33 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 35 (1959).
172. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1573 (1956) ; cf., PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 510-11
(2d ed. 1955).
173. Ketterer v.Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
174. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (separate opinion of Traynor, J.).
175. 139 Tex. 609, 618, 164 S.W.2d 828, 832 (1942).
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Other courts, however, have felt the need for the prop of fiction
in reaching this result. In the exceptional cases which have imposed
strict liability on the manufacturer, many fictions have been used. Once
again the emotional drive has centered in the stomach and these developments are at present practically confined to food cases. 76 The
most acceptable fiction has been to spell out a third party beneficiary
contract in favor of the consumer from the circumstances of the modern
chain of distribution.
First of all, it is clear that a warranty is to be implied from the
manufacturer to his vendee. 177 But it is well known that the chances
of the latter, who buys for resale rather than consumption, being
personally injured, are very slight. As Judge Cardozo said in a
slightly different context in the MacPherson case: "The dealer was
indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some approach
to certainty that by him the car would not be used."' 17' Therefore, the
argument runs, 179 if the warranty of safety is to serve the purpose of

protecting health and safety it must give rights to others than the immediate vendee of the manufacturer. The only situations where the
immediate vendee will avail himself of the rights created by the manufacturer's warranty will be where he has had to pay damages under a
similar warranty running between himself and the sub-purchaser and
he seeks recoupment from his vendor - a situation which wears the
appearance of the trustee acting on behalf of the beneficiary to enforce
the trust. The argument is well developed in the opinion in Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino :180

"The Baking Company, when it delivered the cake in question to the groceryman, to say the least, impliedly represented to
the public, who is the ultimate consumer, that this cake is free
from injurious substances and fit for consumption as food. There
is no doubt that an implied warranty arises between the groceryman who purchased the cake and the Baking Company. Since
the Baking Company was fully aware that the groceryman did
not purchase the cakes for his own consumption, but purchased
the same instead for the purpose of selling the same to members
of the public, who are the ultimate consumers, this implied obligation which unquestionably arose in favor of the groceryman
may be legally said to have also arisen for the benefit of the
176. Not entirely though. See Noel, Manufacturers of Products - The Drift
Toward Strict Liability, 24 TNN. L. Riv. 963, 989-95 (1957).
177. 2 WnLISTON, SA.'iS § 614 (2d ed. 1924).
178. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.W. 1050, 1053

(1916).
179. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 464-65, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (separate opinion of Traynor, J.).
180. 27 Ohio App. 475, 481-82, 161 N.E. 557, 559 (1928).
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consumer. The groceryman, who is in effect merely a distributing medium for the articles of food furnished by the Baking
Company, having full knowledge of that fact, .

.

. entered into

a contractual relationship for the benefit of the public, which is
the ultimate consumer. In other words, this contract between the
groceryman and the Ward Baking Company to all intents and
purposes was a contract entered into for the benefit of a third
party, to wit, the ultimate consumer. Whatever implied warranty arises in favor of the groceryman, who established the contractual relationship with the Baking Company, is for the benefit
of the third party, namely, the ultimate consumer."
The objection that the injured person eo nomine is not known at
the time of contracting may be met by pointing out that there are other
cases where is was possible to say this, but where the courts have
nevertheless spelled out a third party beneficiary contract.181
Another fiction by which strict liability has been imposed is the
theory that the cause of action vested in the manufacturer's vendee is
assignable to the sub-purchaser. This theory presents difficulties. First,
although the original buyer can, by appropriate language, assign his
contract of purchase with all rights thereunder, "the mere resale of
the article is not sufficient evidence in and of itself

. . .

to show that

the original buyer intended to part with his cause of action for
damages against the one who originally sold the article to him."' 8 2
Second, even if it is treated as having been assigned, warranties have
been regarded very much like insurance policies, as contracts of personal indemnity, so that all the original purchaser could have assigned
would be his cause of action if he should happen to be injured.
There are other fictions. Perhaps most frequently encountered
is the theory that the warranty runs with the chattel, just as covenants
run with the land. An example is provided by Mazetti v. Armour &
Co., 88 where it was said: "A manufacturer of food products under
modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in
original packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may
be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade."
Although most of the courts which have imposed strict liability
through these theories have done so in relation to food, a recent trend
is discernible to extend these doctrines to other products.18 4 It seems
that food is performing the thin-edge-of-the-wedge function it per181.
mediate
182.
183.
184.

Jeanblanc, Manufacturers Liability to Persons Other Than Their ImVendees, 24 VA. L. Rtv. 134, 154 (1937).
Id. at 151.
75 Wash. 622, 630, 135 Pac. 633, 636 (1913).
PROSSMR, LAW Op TORTS 510 nn.46-51 (2d ed. 1955).
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formed in the development of vendor's warranty and of the negligence
action. The predicted trend should ultimately place the responsibility
for dangers resulting from the use of products on the industry producing them, and free this branch of the law "from the restrictions on
warranties which operate so arbitrarily and capriciously when they are
transplanted from commercial law to the accident problem."' 8 5
185. 2

HARPER & JAMES,

TORTS 1593 (1956).

[TO BE CONTINUED]
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